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INTRODUCTION 
 
Practically every attorney in every state of the United States of America 
takes an oath to uphold the US and that state’s Constitution. Upon taking the 
oath, most US lawyers become an officer of the court (“judicial officer”). As 
an officer of the court they are held to a higher standard of integrity and 
candor as is required by that state’s professional responsibility rules. As such, 
although an attorney is an advocate for his client, in some situations, an 
attorney must set aside his role as advocate and assert his role as judicial 
officer to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and uphold the US and 
state Constitution. 
The constant tension between an attorney’s role as judicial officer and 
advocate occurs because giving advice about the law an attorney’s main 
purpose and often that advice may further criminal conduct. However, as 
Professor Newman eloquently put it, “[n]either the status of ‘lawyer’ nor the 
obligation to provide access to the law should exempt lawyers from the 
criminal liabilities which face everyone else.”1  
While Professor Newman was specifically referring to a lawyer’s 
responsibility in the domestic sphere, this is equally applicable to a legal 
advisor’s responsibility to the international community. Concededly, an 
attorney does not take an oath to uphold international law. However, because 
a lawyer should not be exempt from the law, each and every attorney, like 
everyone else, should be legally responsible to the international community.  
This article argues that there are some limited situations where a lawyer, 
specifically a government legal advisor, has certain basic legal responsibilities 
to the international community that trump his responsibility to his 
government. As the Nuremberg trials emphasized, no government official is 
immune from an international crime simply because he is acting within his 
official capacity. Rather, because the State cannot act without people to act on 
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1 Joel Newman Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U Rich L Rev 287, 288 (1994). 
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its behalf and because only the person acting on behalf of the State may 
commit war crimes, the official is individually responsible for his actions.2  
Furthermore, while a legal advisor is not truly considered a policymaker, 
this, by itself, does not dissociate the legal advisor from the policy. 
Accordingly, when a legal advisor is so entangled in the policy such that he 
breaches his responsibility to the international community, he must be held 
accountable for the criminality of that policy. 
As such, this article will analyze the extent of responsibility that a 
government legal advisor legally owes to the international community. As 
background, Part II of this article surveys two affirmative defenses that 
generally arise when prosecuting a government official for a war crime: 
official immunity and immunity for acting pursuant to superior orders. Part III 
suggests an analysis of whether a legal advisor has breached his international 
responsibility should depend on a sliding scale test that considers the legal 
advisor’s mens rea and the legal advisor’s influence over the illegal policy. 
Part IV provides a practical application of the suggested analysis by 
evaluating four scenarios where a legal advisor is internationally responsible 
for playing a significant role in an international crime.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
There are two main issues that, like any other government official, are 
relevant to prosecuting a legal advisor as a war criminal: (a) immunity for acts 
committed as a high government official; and (b) immunity for acts made 
pursuant to superior orders.  
A legal advisor may not claim immunity for international crimes simply 
because he is acting in his official capacity.3 This follows from two 
2 United States v von Leeb (US Mil Trib 1948), reprinted in 11 Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10, 
at 462, 508 (1950) [hereinafter High Command Case] (“The state being but an 
inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine 
policies, exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or deterred from action 
except through its animate agents and representatives”). 
3 The International Law Commission (“ILC”) succinctly summarized this in 
Nuremberg Principle III: “The fact that a person who committed an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible 
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international 
law.” Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal: Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, 5 UN GAOR Supp (No 12) at 11, UN Doc 
A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 YB Int’l L Comm’n 364, 375, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add [hereinafter Nürnberg Principles]; see J Spiropoulos, 
Formulation of Nürnberg Principles, UN Doc A/CN.4/22 (1950), reprinte  in [1950] 
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underlying tenets: (1) international law is superior to domestic law; and (2) 
deterrence is greatest where individual responsibility is placed on the authors 
of criminal policies. Although the superiority of international law may simply 
support State liability, “[i]t would be an utter disregard of reality and but legal 
shadow-boxing to say that only the [S]tate, the inanimate entity, can have 
guilt, and that no guilt can be attributed to its animate agents who devise and 
execute its policies.”4 Rather, because the State cannot act on its own and 
must necessarily act through the will of its agents, the only way to deter a 
State’s criminal action is by making its agents, including legal advisors, 
criminally responsible for their personal acts.5  
The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, 
protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are 
condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot 
shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from 
punishment in appropriate proceedings.6  
Thus, while a legal advisor’s official capacity shields him from most 
liability, the legal advisor is directly responsible for his actions that are 
criminal under international law.7
 
2 YB Int’l L Comm’n 181, 192, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.1; see also Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No 
10) at 14, art 7, UN Doc. A/51/10, Corr 1, Corr 2 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 YB 
Int’l L Comm’n 15, pt 2, 31 UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1, Corr 1 [hereinafter 
Draft Code of P&SM] (“The official position of an individual who commits a crime 
against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or 
Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.”) 
4 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 508. 
5 United States v Göring (Int’l Mil Trib 1946), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals 
Before the International Military Tribunal 223 (1947), available at 
http://www.mazal.org/Default.htm [hereinafter Major War Criminals] (“Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”); High Command Case, above  note 2, at 508 (“The state being but an 
inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine 
policies, exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or deterred from action 
except through its animate agents and representatives.”) 
6 Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 223. 
7 Sir Arthur Watts gives a concise explanation of a Head of State’s general 
protections, privileges, and immunities. Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in 
International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers, 
in 247 Recueil Des Cours 19, 35-81 (1994). Many of these immunities can be 
extended, by analogy, to other government officials. 
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 In addition, the mere fact that an official acts in some other capacity 
besides a military leader does not immunize him from international 
responsibility. For example, although Joachim von Ribbentrop was the 
Foreign Policy Adviser to Hitler,8 the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) 
held that even assuming that Von Ribbentrop “was personally concerned with 
the diplomatic rather than the military aspect of those actions, his diplomatic 
efforts were so closely connected with war that he could not have remained 
unaware of the [illegality] of Hitler’s actions.”9
Furthermore, a person acting in his official capacity as a legal advisor 
may not simply shield himself from his initiation or creation of criminal 
policy by claiming that his work product is legal advice. For example, Rudolf 
Lehmann, Chief of the Legal Department of the OKW, was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment for his “criminal connection” to the Barbarossa 
Jurisdiction Order, the Commando Order, and the Night and Fog Decree.10 In 
addition, Joachim von Ribbentrop, although the Foreign Policy Adviser to 
Hitler, was convicted of war crimes for his memorandum justifying the Nazi’s 
aggressive actions on Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries.11
Concomitant with the principle that one may not claim immunity for acts 
within one’s official capacity is that acting pursuant to superior orders does 
not necessarily immunize a legal advisor from international responsibility.12 If 
a person cannot claim immunity for his official actions, then a junior person 
8 Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 287. 
9 Id at 285. 
10 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 690-95. 
11 Major War Criminals, above note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in 
advance of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low 
Countries, and prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify 
these aggressive actions”); see Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F Vagts, Speaking Law to 
Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AJIL 689, 694 (2004) (“It is worth recalling that 
Ribbentrop was convicted at Nuremberg for having issued memoranda justifying the 
Nazi preemptive strikes against Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries in 1940”). 
12 This is ILC Principle IV: “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility under international 
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.” Nürnberg Principles, 
above  note 3, 2 YB Int’l L Comm’n at 375; see J Spiropoulos, above  note 3, 2 YB 
Int’l L Comm’n at 192-93; see also Draft Code of P&SM art 5, above  note 3, [1996] 
2 YB Int’l L Comm’n at 23 (“The fact that an individual charged with a crime against 
the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order of a Government or a 
superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if justice so requires”). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
161 
                                                     
acting pursuant to superior orders may not claim immunity for obeying or for 
being influenced by those superior orders.13  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Because a legal advisor is not exempt from international law, to the extent 
that a legal advisor is “[c]omplicit in the commission of . . . a war crime,” he 
is acting criminally under international law.14 For example, under the 
policymaker rule, a policymaker who creates or implements a policy, order, 
legislation, or decree which authorizes or directs the commission of a crime is 
a war criminal if the crime was actually committed in the prosecution of 
war.15 Generally, a legal advisor does not fall under the policymaker rule. 
However, if a war crime actually occurred, a legal advisor maybe criminally 
responsible for policy that directed or implemented the war crime if he 
understands the consequences of the policy and has enough influence to shape 
the policy. In other words, a legal advisor has not committed a war crime 
unless he has what the International Military Tribunal called a “moral choice.”  
 
THE THEORY OF COMPLICITY REQUIRES THAT A WAR 
CRIME ACTUALLY OCCUR 
 
Because a legal advisor’s international responsibility is based on 
complicity, and not conspiracy, the threshold inquiry, of course, is whether a 
war crime actually occurred.16 Thus, an official is not individually responsible 
13 A legal advisor acting pursuant to superior orders, however, may not have the 
requisite culpability. Since mere association to criminal conduct is not sufficient, 
acting pursuant to superior orders may effectively negate an essential part of the 
balancing test prescribed below. High Command Case, above  note 2, at 484 
(“[Because] criminal responsibility is an individual matter[,] criminal guilt must be 
personal”). 
14 Nürnberg Principles, above  note 3, 2 YB Int’l L Comm’n at 377. 
15 Draft Code of P&SM art 5, above note 3, 2 YB Int’l LComm’n at 23; see 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, August. 8, 1945, Appendix, art 6, 59 Stat 1544, 82 UNTS 279 
[hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal] (“Leaders, organizers, 
instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for 
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”); Whitney R. Harris, 
Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg 503 (rev. ed. 1999) (“War crimes must 
be committed in the course of war, and must be related to war prosecution”). 
16 Draft Code of P&SM art 2, above  note 3, [1996] 2 YB Int’l LComm’n at 18-19; 
see, eg, High Command Case, above  note 2, at 565 (acquitting Hugo Sperrle because, 
although he may have ordered subordinate units to force Russian prisoners of war to 
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if an international standard was not breached17 or if the breach did not amount 
to a “grave harm to the international community.”18
While some international scholars have interpreted the Geneva 
Conventions to delineate war crime standards based on whether the armed 
conflict was international or non-international in character, the current 
customary international law makes no such distinction. During international 
armed conflict, that is armed conflict between two or more (Sovran) states,19 
war crimes are acts that constitute a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions.20 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions include willful 
 
work in construction units, there was no evidence in the record that a crime was 
actually committed). 
17 Conspiracy to commit a war crime has not yet risen to the level of international 
responsibility. However, because a conspiracy to commit an act of aggression is the 
essence of a crime against peace, conspiracy is an international crime in that context. 
Major War Criminals, above note 5, at 223. Some commentators, however, suggest 
that conspiracy, as a war crime, has gained status in the international community. See 
Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 Syracuse J Int’l 
L& Com 1, 11 n 60 (1995). However, conspiracy has not risen to the level of 
customary international law. Professor Little and Richard Barrett succinctly explained 
the difference between complicity and conspiracy in Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: 
A Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 Minn L Rev 30, 37 (2003). 
18 Robert K Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials in International Law 110 (2d ed. 1962); see 
United States v List (US Mil Trib1948), reprinted in 11 Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10, at 1241 
(1950) [hereinafter Hostage Case] (“An international crime is such an act universally 
recognized as criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international concern 
and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
that would have control over it under ordinary circumstances”). 
19 The definition of international armed conflict is based on Common Article 2. 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, art 2, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 
August 12, 1949, art 2, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August. 12, 
1949, art 2, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, August. 12, 
1949, art 2, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
20 Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia, 16 Mich J Int’l L783, 800 n 58 (1995); see Geneva Convention I, above  
note 19, art 49; Geneva Convention II, above note 19, art 50; Geneva Convention III, 
above  note 19, art 129; Geneva Convention IV, above note 19, art 146; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
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killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health.21
Concededly, when the conflict is not of an international character, the 
Geneva Conventions do not explicitly mandate individual responsibility. 
Common Article 3, however, creates limited protection to persons 
participating in a non-international armed conflict.22 “Guerrillas, therefore, 
even if unprivileged combatants and not entitled on capture to the status of 
prisoners of war, would appear now always to be entitled to humane treatment 
and trial by a regular court.”23 Moreover, the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) stated that Common Article 3 is the “minimum yardstick” for any type 
of armed conflict and constitutes customary international law.24 Like grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture[,] . . .taking of 
hostages[,] . . .outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment[,] . . . the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous [judgment] pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples25 are all concerns that the international 
community does not take lightly. Accordingly, if the IMT’s analysis is 
similarly applicable to non-international armed conflict, government officials 
are internationally responsible for violating Common Article 3 or, in the 
alternative, responsible for violating customary international law.26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art 85 1, 1125 
UNTS. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]. 
21 Geneva Convention I, above  note 19, art 50; Geneva Convention II, above  note 
19, art 51; Geneva Convention III, above  note 19, art 130; Geneva Convention IV, 
above  note 19, art 147. 
22 Geneva Convention I-V, above  note 19, art 3 [collectively Common Article 3]. 
23 Julius Stone Legal Controls of International Conflict 567 (2d ed 1959). 
24 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v US), 1986 ICJ 14 218 (June 27). 
25 Common Article 3, above  note 22. 
26 Id Geneva Protocol II also deals with the rules of non-international armed conflict. 
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 UNTS. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol II]. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
164 
                                                     
SUFFICIENT CULPABILITY OR “MORAL CHOICE” IS A 
REQUISITE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALITY 
 
Even if a war crime actually occurred, a legal advisor will not be 
internationally responsible for illegal acts unless he has sufficient 
culpability.27 The Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”) in the High 
Command Case explained that the culpability requirement was extracted from 
“fundamental principle[s] of criminal law as generally accepted by the 
civilized nations of the world . . . .” Id. Similarly, the IMT defined culpability 
by asking whether the actor had a “moral choice.”28 The IMT determined 
whether the actor had a “moral choice” by analyzing the actor’s mens rea and 
his actual ability to influence policy on the other.29  
Accordingly, when a legal advisor has a high mens rea and a weak ability 
to influence or ignore criminal policy, he is sufficiently culpable. For 
example, this occurs when a legal advisor has actual knowledge of the 
criminality of the policy.30 Actual knowledge31 satisfies the “moral choice” 
standard because the legal advisor knows that one choice is permissible and 
27 High Command Case, above note 2, at 484. The Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
(“NMT”) in the High Command Case noted that the culpability requirement was 
extracted from “fundamental principle[s] of criminal law as generally accepted by the 
civilized nations of the world . . . .” Id at 510. Thus, since mere association is not 
sufficient to support criminal responsibility, strict liability does not satisfy the 
culpability standard. Id at 511 (“[A person] cannot be held criminally responsible for 
a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal questions”). 
28 The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) acknowledged that the requisite 
individual culpability is satisfied when a “moral choice was in fact possible.” Major 
War Criminals, above note 5, at 224. The NMT described the requisite culpability as 
“a personal act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under 
international law.” High Command Case, above  note 2, at 511. 
29 In essence, the mens rea analysis tests whether the actor understood that he had a 
decision to make and the ability to influence policy tests whether the actor had the 
ability to choose between right and wrong. 
30 High Command Case, above note 2, at 693. For example, in holding Lehmann 
responsible for the criminality of the Commando Order, the NMT emphasized that 
“[Lehmann] was well aware of the criminal nature of this order.” Id at 693. 
31 The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) defines knowledge in two ways: “(i) if the 
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware 
that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist, and (ii) if the 
element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that 
his conduct will cause such a result.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (1962). “When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such 
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, 
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” Id at 2.02(8).  
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the other choice is illegal. Thus, the legal advisor has the chance to choose the 
permissible action. 
On the other end of the spectrum, if a legal advisor has a low mens rea but 
a strong ability to influence criminal policy he is criminally culpable. The 
axiom that ignorance of the law is no excuse speaks well for this type of 
situation.32 At this level of mens rea, criminal responsibility would apply “if a 
[legal advisor] can reasonable be expected to know that the act is a crime.”33 
Thus, the standard is whether a reasonable legal advisor should have known 
that the policy was criminal.34
In this respect, the author argues that the reasonable legal advisor standard 
is the general practice of legal advisors as recognized by civilized nations.35 
One can appreciate this by analyzing the High Command Case and comparing 
the reasonable legal advisor with the field commander of normal intelligence 
(“reasonable field commander”) and the differing roles that they play in war. 
The NMT in the High Command Case reasoned that because the field 
commander performs in active combat and does not have the full resources 
that are available to legal advisors, a reasonable field commander “has the 
right to presume, in the absence of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the 
legality of such orders has been properly determined before their issuance.”36 
Thus, the NMT found it was excusable for a field commander to transmit 
criminal orders during active combat when he passed the order down the 
32 Woetzel, above  note 18, at 118-19 (“It is clear the ignorance of the criminal nature 
of the act is no excuse . . ”). 
33 Id at 119. This sounds very similar to the MPC definition of negligence. See Model 
Penal Code 2.02(2)(d). 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 
34 High Command Case, above note 2, at 512 (standard of “normal intelligence”). 
While the NMT is referring to the standard applicable to a commanding officer, the 
main tenets of the NMT’s analysis are equally applicable to a legal advisor. 
Especially important to note is that the NMT specifically distinguishes the limited 
legal capacities of field commanders in active combat from those of legal advisors. Id 
at 511. Thus, this suggests that the standard as to whether an order is “criminal upon 
its face” depends on the ordinary legal facilities associated with a person acting within 
a specific duty and in the case of a legal advisor, the ordinary legal facilities are 
greater than a field commander. 
35 The author adapts article 38 of the ICJ statute to a legal advisor’s work product 
standard. See UN Charter annex art 38 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]. 
36 High Command Case, above note 2, at 511. 
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chain of command unless the order was “criminal upon its face” or if he 
actually knew the order was criminal. 37 The NMT explained that an order is 
“criminal upon its face” if a legal opinion was not necessary to understand the 
illegality of the order.38  
However, compared to a field commander, a legal advisor is in a better 
position to influence policy: a reasonable legal advisor is not generally in 
active combat and has the faculties to better understand the legality of the 
policy. Thus, the legal advisor may be culpable when he does not actually 
know that the policy is “criminal upon its face.” On the other hand, if, after 
diligent research, a legal advisor cannot determine whether an act is criminal, 
then he would be in a situation similar to a reasonable field commander: he 
would not have the ability to choose between right and wrong. 
Finally, if he had absolutely no ability to influence criminal policy(,) then 
no matter what his mens rea was, he had no “moral choice” and is not 
internationally responsible for the war crimes that occurred due to the 
criminal policy under the policymaker rule.39 A “moral choice” is lacking in 
two circumstances: (1) where the actor has no ability to influence the policy;40 
and (2) where a reasonable person could not have acted any other way.41
An actor falls under the first circumstance only if he did all that he could 
and yet failed to resist the illegal policy. While Professor Woetzel suggests 
that a tribunal may consider the “extent an individual could resist an illegal 
order,”42 implying that something short of doing everything to resist the 
illegal policy would suffice, the Justice Case suggests otherwise. Most telling 
is that in the Justice Case, Curt Rothenberger, the State Secretary of the Reich 
Ministry of Justice, was convicted of “aid[ing] and abett[ing] in the program 
of racial persecution, and notwithstanding his many protestations to the 
37 Id at 509; cf Hostage Case, above note 18, at 1236 (“[I]f the illegality of the order 
was not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected to 
know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime 
exists and the inferior will be protected”). This “clearly criminal” or criminality “on 
its face” standard suggests a recklessness standard. See Model Penal Code 2.02(2)(c) 
(1962). 
38 High Command Case, above note 2, at 512. 
39 Some tribunals seem to refer to this as an affirmative defense. 
40 In the circumstance where the actor has no ability to influence the policy, it is 
unclear whether the burden of proof is on the prosecution or the defense. 
41 This is a claim of duress. According to the final judgment in Prosecutor v. 
Erdemovic, “duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a 
crime against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human 
beings....” Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment 17 
(October 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
42 See Woetzel, above  note 18, at 118-19. 
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contrary [the NMT held that] he materially contributed toward the prostitution 
of the Ministry of Justice.”43  
However, where an actor “protests” against the application of the policy 
“opposes it in every way short of open and defiant refusal to obey it” and yet 
the policy is applied, the actor is not criminally responsible for the resulting 
illegal actions connected to the policy.44 A good example of an actor who fell 
into this circumstance is von Leeb and his connection to the Commissar 
Order.45 The NMT held that von Leeb did all that he could do and therefore, 
was not responsible for the resulting catastrophe of the Commissar Order.46
An actor is in the second circumstance if a “reasonable man would 
apprehend such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to 
choose the right and refrain from the wrong[.]”47 In such circumstance, the 
actor is not personally responsible for the crime committed. According to the 
NMT in the Einstazgruppen Case, the reasonable man would weigh the harm 
caused by obeying the illegal policy against harm caused by disobeying the 
illegal policy.48  
Arguably, as Judge Cassese stated in his separate and dissenting opinion 
in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, this balance sounds like one simply must take the 
“lesser of two evils.”49 However, tribunal decisions have required the illegal 
policy to be more than the lesser of two evils. For example, in the Justice 
Case, even though “[t]he evidence conclusively show[ed that in order to 
maintain the Ministry of Justice in the good graces of Hitler and to prevent its 
utter defeat by Himmler's police,” Franz Schlegelberger, Acting Reich 
Minister of Justice, was convicted under counts two and three of the 
indictment.50
43 United States v Altstötter, (US Mil Trib1 948), reprinted in 3 Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 
10, at 1118 [hereinafter Justice Case]. 
44 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 557. 
45 Id at 555-58. 
46 Id at 557-58. 
47 Id at 509. 
48 United States v Ohlendorf (US Mil Trib1 949), reprinted in 4 Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 
10, at 471 [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case] (“If the nature of the ordered act is 
manifestly beyond the scope of the superior’s authority, the subordinate may not 
plead ignorance of the criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the execution 
of an illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying the illegal order 
is not disproportionately greater than the harm which would result from not obeying 
the illegal order”). 
49 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, No IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Cassese, 16 (October 7, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
50 Justice Case, above  note 43, at 1086-87. 
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For several reasons, this is an onerous standard to meet. One, past cases 
suggest that the tribunals will assume that a person has some type of 
influence, in effect shifting the burden of proof onto the accused.51 Two, 
because the standard does not consider the actor’s subjective view, the 
tribunal may disregard the irrationality that the actor may face when 
attempting to reason whether the physical peril was imminent.52  
Three, the reasoning that an actor must accomplish before making a 
decision is hardly practical. First, the legal advisor must assess the imminence 
of the physical peril.53 Second, the legal advisor must evaluate the extent of 
damage the illegal order would cause. Third, the legal advisor must compare 
the competing factors and then make a decision. Fourth, this entire analysis 
must be based on foresight, rather than a tribunal’s hindsight analysis. This 
onerous task would put anyone in a difficult position, but the NMT has said 
that being in a “difficult position” is not enough!54  
Finally, even if an actor in the second circumstance understood the extent 
of harm, this balance must greatly favor obeying the illegal policy. The NMT 
stated: “the harm caused by obeying the illegal [policy] is not 
disproportionately greater than the harm which would result from not obeying 
the illegal [policy].”55 Thus, unless the choice is to kill or be killed, the 
balance does not seem to greatly favor obeying the illegal policy.56  
Accordingly, while an affirmative defense exists on paper, it rarely meets 
reality.57
 
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS 
 
Concededly, there are many circumstances where legal advice is too 
tangential to the creation or the implementation of the criminal policy for the 
legal advisor to meet the requisite culpability for international criminal 
51 High Command Case, above note 2, at 509 (emphasizing that this is a defense of 
coercion or necessity). Thus, the author considers this an affirmative defense. 
52 Id  
53 Id (“The defendants in this case who received obviously criminal orders were 
placed in a difficult position, but servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for 
fear of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately threatened cannot be 
recognized as a defense”).  
54 Id  
55 Einsatzgruppen Case, above  note 48, at 471. 
56 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, No IT-96-22-Tbis, Trial Chamber II Judgment, 17 (March 
5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
57 While it may seem difficult to fathom a legal advisor finding himself in “imminent 
physical peril,” judges and prosecutors may find themselves in this situation. See, eg, 
Id at 954. 
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responsibility. However, there are several situations where the legal advisor 
acts under the guise of counsel but actually enters the realm of establishing or 
implementing policy. 
In this respect, this article proposes that a high-ranking legal advisor may 
be internationally responsible for his “advice” under two alternative theories. 
The first theory, addressed in Scenario One through Three, is direct 
responsibility based on the legal advisor’s furtherance of a criminal endeavor. 
This theory applies when a legal advisor gives advice knowing that it will be 
used for an international criminal purpose or knowing that it will be used to 
formulate an illegal policy. This is similar to standards established in the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as set out by the American Bar 
Association and is based on customary international law that planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing, aiding, abetting, or pursuing a common 
international criminal purpose is a war crime.58  
The second theory, addressed in Scenario Four, is command 
responsibility. Unlike the first theory, this theory does not require the advice 
to be criminal. Instead it is based on the idea that the legal advice created a 
“permissive climate” for illegal conduct.59
 
Scenario One:  A Legal Advisor Incorporates His Own Criminal Idea into the 
Final Version of the Policy 
 
The simplest instance is Scenario One where a legal advisor incorporates 
his criminal idea into the final version of the policy.60 In this situation, the 
legal advisor is not even acting as a counselor. To the extent that the legal 
advisor claims that he is simply giving legal advice, the “legal advice” is 
merely a façade to hide his attempt to make criminal policy. 
For example, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”) found that 
Rudolf Lehmann’s criminal idea, to punish individuals that would have been 
58 Prosecutor v Tadic, No IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II Opinion and Judgment 249, 
674 (May 7, 1997). 
59 Bilder & Vagts, above  note 11, at 691. 
60 Several legal advisors at the annual Legal Adviser’s Meeting “stressed that the 
[legal advisor’s] function was also part of the policy formulation process.” Hans 
Corell, Third Legal Adviser’s Meeting at UN Headquarters in New York, 87 A.J.I.L. 
323, 325 (1993) [hereinafter Corell, Third Legal Adviser’s Meeting]. Thus, the author 
suspects that legal advisors may, more often than not, encounter Scenario One. The 
informal meeting, organized by the “Legal Advisers of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland, and Sweden, and with the assistance of the 
Legal Counsel of the United Nations[,]” is meant to create an atmosphere where legal 
advisors can spontaneously debate over the developing issues in international law. 
Hans Corell, Legal Advisers Meet at UN Headquarters in New York, 85 AJIL 371, 
371-73 (1991) [hereinafter Corell, First Legal Adviser’s Meeting]. 
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acquitted by the judicial process, was integrated into the final version of the 
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.61 Finding that Lehmann was the originator of 
the idea, the NMT held “[Lehmann] responsible for [his] criminal connection 
with, participation in, and formulation of [the Barbarossa Jurisdiction 
Order].”62 In addition the NMT also held Lehmann criminally liable for his 
contribution in enlarging the scope of the original Terror and Sabotage 
Decrees.63  
Thus, where the legal advisor is the originator of the criminal idea and 
that criminal idea becomes part of the final policy, the legal advisor is 
responsible for the resulting criminal policy. 
 
Scenario Two: A Legal Advisor Compiles Other People’s Criminal Ideas and 
is the Main Factor in Determining the Final Version of the Policy 
 
A legal advisor in Scenario Two compiles other people’s criminal ideas 
into one concise criminal policy. 64 “If the basic idea is criminal under 
international law, the staff officer who puts that idea into the form of a 
military order, either himself or through subordinates under him, or takes 
personal action to see that it is properly distributed to those units where it 
becomes effective, commits a criminal act under international law.”65 A good 
example of a legal advisor in Scenario Two is Lehmann and his connection to 
the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, the Commando Order, the Night and Fog 
Decree, and the Terror and Sabotage Decree.66  
61 See High Command Case, above  note 2, at 691-93. The Tribunal found that it was 
Lehmann’s idea to completely deny jurisdiction to the courts, in effect giving the 
troops complete discretion to dispose cases. Id at 692-93. This “left the door wide 
open to the decision of an officer of at least the rank of a battalion commander to 
impose such collective punishments as he saw fit.” Id at 692. Lehmann’s idea was 
particularly important because, in Lehmann’s own words, “troops will get rid of just 
those cases which they consider awkward, namely, the doubtful cases by handling 
them over to the courts.” Id at 692-93. Thus, Lehmann intended to permit the 
punishment of individuals that would have been acquitted for lack of evidence. Id at 
693. This, the IMT held, was criminal: “This provision in the order . . . is one of the 
most vicious parts of the orders.” Id 
62 Id at 693; see Id (“This provision in the order [was] obviously [] not derived from 
Hitler, or Keitel, or Jodi ...”). 
63 Id at 695. 
64 The NMT described it this way: “[t]he basic criminal offense is in the essential part 
a staff officer [or legal advisor] performs in making effective the criminal whole.” Id 
at 693.  
65 Id at 513.  
66 High Command Case, above note 2, at 691-95. Although Lehmann’s ideas were 
incorporated into the Barbarossa Jurisdiction order, the NMT emphasized that 
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A legal advisor’s responsibility in Scenario Two is based on both a 
deterrence and culpability rationale. The deterrence theory is based on the fact 
that no matter how much authority one person has, he cannot implement that 
policy by himself.67 Those who draft policy are “indispensable” and an 
“essential contribution to the final execution” of criminal policy.68 Thus, a 
person with a criminal idea necessarily needs other people to help implement 
it by consolidating it into a coherent policy. By deterring those key players, 
the originator of the criminal idea will be greatly impeded from implementing 
the criminal idea. 
In addition, a legal advisor in Scenario Two meets the requisite 
culpability because underlying Scenario Two are two important features: (1) 
that a legal advisor acting in this capacity has the obligation and resources to 
detect the criminality of the ideas; and (2) that a legal advisor acting in this 
capacity has substantial influence over the final structure of the criminal 
policy. First, unlike the intermediate administrative officer who routinely 
transmits orders and has no time to screen the orders he transmits, a 
reasonable legal advisor has time to deliberate over the policies.69 
Furthermore, unlike field commanders, a reasonable legal advisor has time 
and resources to detect the illegality.70 In fact, a legal advisor’s specialty is to 
determine the legality of a proposed conduct. 
Second, unlike both the intermediate administrative officer and the field 
commander, a legal advisor in Scenario Two has substantial influence over 
the final structure of the criminal policy. Because the legal advisor performs a 
“fundamental and essential function . . . in producing military orders [and 
policy] from an original idea[,]”71 a legal advisor is the “main factor in 
 
Lehmann was also responsible for his contribution to the final form of that order. Id at 
693. 
67 The NMT recognized this in its analysis of crimes against peace. Id at 486 (“No 
matter how absolute his authority, Hitler alone could not formulate a policy of 
aggressive war and alone implement that policy by preparing, planning, and waging 
such war”). 
68 Id at 515. 
69 See Id at 510 (explaining that the intermediate administrative function of 
transmitting an order does not amount to the requisite personal guilt because 
“transmittal is a routine function[,]” “in many instances [it] would be handled . . . 
without being called to his attention[,]” and the person transmitting “is not in a 
position to screen orders so transmitted”). 
70 See below Part IVB. Cf. High Command Case, above  note 2, at 511 (explaining 
that because a field commander makes decisions in active combat and has limited 
legal facilities, “[a field commander] has the right to presume, in the absence of 
specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been properly 
determined before their issuance”). 
71 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 691. 
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[implementing] the final form” of the policy.72 A legal advisor acting in this 
capacity “modifie[s] those ideas within his own sphere up to a certain point 
and place[s] the whole into an effective military order which [is] transmitted 
to the troops and carried out.”73 Therefore, a legal advisor acting in this 
capacity has the requisite culpability to be held accountable for the criminal 
policy.  
 
Scenario Three: A Legal Advisor Attempts to Cover A Criminal Policy with 
the Spin of Legality 
 
In Scenario Three, a legal advisor is criminally implicated where he is 
aware of the criminal nature of the policy, but nevertheless, attempts to give it 
an appearance of legality.74 Scenario Three has at least two variants. In the 
first variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is criminal, revises the 
criminal policy to give it an impression of legality.75 This is especially 
significant in modern international law because legal advice is often an 
attempt to cover illegal policy with legal analysis.76 For example, Rudolf 
Lehmann was held criminally responsible for a part of the Commando Order 
for “ma[king] certain suggestions as to methods which might, by a strained 
construction, give some appearance of legality and be suitable for publication; 
constructions which he apparently did not believe himself.”77  
In the second variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is criminal, 
justifies the legality of the criminal policy in hopes of convincing other people 
that the criminal policy is actually legal.78 It would seem that such an analysis 
72 Id at 693. As of 1939, customary international law made it criminal for the 
participation of military officers at the policy influencing level. Id at 489. 
73 Id 
74 Id at 693-94. 
75 See Id 
76 Newman, above  note 1, at 287; see Stanko Nick, The Role of the Legal Adviser in 
Modern Diplomatic Services, in Modern Diplomacy (Jovan Kurbalija ed., 1998), at 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/ (last visited April 14, 2005) (“It 
is significant that even countries and their leaders who bluntly break fundamental 
rules and principles of international law almost invariably make a considerable effort 
to wrap their acts in a legally presentable or at least justifiable form”). 
77 High Command Case, above note 2, at 693-94. 
78 See Major War Criminals, above note 5, at 286. Often in a situation like this a legal 
advisor is attempting to “assist or provide a ‘road map’,” which amounts to 
complicity in the criminal conduct. Bilder & Vagts, above note 11, at 694 (citations 
omitted). Because legal advisors often encounter this situation, the International Law 
Commission has expressed doubt over the value of a legal advisor’s opinion as 
evidence of customary international law. See Manley O. Hudson, Article 24 of the 
Statute of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/16, reprinted in 
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could never amount to a war crime. After all, it is the client who chooses to 
act. However, legal advice is often requested to further a criminal endeavor.79 
In some situations, a reasonable legal advisor would understand that the most 
likely reason a client would request advice on the specific issue is to avoid the 
consequences of a crime already committed or a crime that may be committed 
in the future.80 For example, Ribbentrop was held criminally responsible for 
justifying aggressive actions on Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries.81  
Unlike the previous two scenarios, however, a legal advisor in Scenario 
Three may not have the requisite culpability.82 First, because the legal advisor 
is reviewing someone else’s final product, he has less influence over the 
resulting policy. Second, the conduct of either revising a policy to conform to 
international standards or justifying the legality of the policy falls under 
genuine legal counsel. Thus, a more demanding mens rea standard is required 
to prevent the presumption of criminal responsibility based on mere 
association to the criminal policy. 
Third, the most important reason for a higher mens rea standard is that the 
conduct alone may merely be a result of negligence or mistake. Before a legal 
advisor counsels his client on the legal consequences of a proposed conduct, 
the legal advisor must determine what the law is at that time and then 
determine whether the proposed conduct may violate the law.83 When the 
issue touches upon public international law, the legal advisor must not only 
interpret applicable treaties, but must also recognize “international custom, as 
 
[1950] 2 YB Int’l LComm’n 24, 30, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add (“Reserve 
may be needed in assessing the value of [opinions of legal advisers] as evidence of 
customary international law, for the efforts of legal advisers are necessarily directed 
to the implementation of policy”). 
79 Newman, above note 1, at 287. 
80 Id (“There might be legitimate reasons for such a request, but the most likely reason 
would be a desire to avoid prosecution for a committed crime”). 
81 See Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in 
advance of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low 
Countries, and prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify 
these aggressive actions.”); see Bilder & Vagts, above  note 11, at 694 (analogizing 
Ribbentrop’s issuance of the memoranda justifying the attack to a legal advisor’s 
criminal actions). 
82 As stated in Part IV, above, culpability is a function of both the legal advisor’s 
actual ability to influence policy and the legal advisor’s mens rea. 
83 This is similar to the two-part test that Judge Anderson expressed in his concurring 
opinion in the Krupp Case. United States v Krupp (US Mil Trib1949), reprinted in 9 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control 
Council Law No 10, at 405 (1950) [hereinafter Krupp Case] (“(a) [W]hat was the law 
at the time in question and (b) does the evidence show prima facie that the defendants 
or any of them violated it”). 
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evidence of a general practice accepted as law, the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations, . . . [and] judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations . . . .”84 Thus, 
because “[the] law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs 
of a changing world[,]”85 it is especially difficult for a legal advisor to 
determine the current understanding of issues not yet solidified by 
international consensus. 
In this respect, knowledge that the policy is actually criminal would 
suffice. In addition, if the policy were criminal on its face, a legal advisor 
would have sufficient culpability to be held responsible for the policy.86  
There are three practical reasons for applying criminality for Scenario 
Three. One, a person knowledgeable in the law is the best person to hide the 
criminality of the policy, thus making the crime more difficult to detect. Two, 
“there may be strong pressures on government lawyers [or legal advisors] to 
‘bend’ or ignore the law in order to support policy decisions . . . .”87 If the 
legal advisor is not held responsible for his advice, then he will not be 
deterred from caving into these strong pressures, even when his legal insight 
strongly suggests that the policy is criminal. Three, because “foreign policy 
decisions are often highly political, and policymakers and others who 
influence policy are often skeptical concerning the relevance of international 
law[,]”88 a legal advisor who informs the government that the proposed 
conduct is most likely illegal will have strong influence on the final policy 
decision. This is especially so when the legal advisor is counseling a 
democratic, law-abiding country.89  
84 Statute of the ICJ art 38, above  note 35; see Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 
221. 
85 Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 221. 
86 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 509. The NMT also suggested that 
believing the policy to be criminal is sufficient. Id at 693-94. However, if this is the 
case, how much faith must a legal advisor have in the legality of a policy before he is 
willing to venture into revising or justifying a policy? The author suggests that the 
NMT merely interchanged the meaning of “belief” with “knowledge.” Otherwise, this 
would rely too heavily on the reasonable legal advisor standard, which is quite 
malleable. 
87 Bilder & Vagts, above  note 11, at 693 (citations omitted); see C G Weeramantry, 
Universalising International Law 212 (2004) (“All too often at the highest levels of 
government and foreign and military policy there is an expectation that legal opinions 
will conform to the wishes of those in authority . . . ”). 
88 Bilder & Vagts, above  note 11, at 693 (citations omitted). 
89 More and more states have a policy of abiding by international law. Weeramantry, 
above  note 87, at 211 (“Signs are discernible at the highest levels of state policy of an 
increased readiness to abide by the dictates of international law”).    
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Scenario Four: A Legal Advisor Creates or Implements a Policy, Which While 
Not Illegal, Creates A Permissive Atmosphere For Criminal Conduct 
 
Unlike the previous three instances where the legal advisor is held 
responsible for his direct participation in a criminal conduct, in Scenario Four, 
the legal advisor, if at all, is held criminally accountable based on the rubric of 
command responsibility.90 The best example of Scenario Four is Field 
Marshall Wilhelm von Leeb’s connection to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order 
in the High Command Case.91 As commander of his army group, he put the 
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order into the chain of command.92 The NMT 
concluded that even if the order was not criminal, it “was at best ambiguous in 
respect to the authority conferred upon a junior officer to shoot individuals 
who were merely suspected of certain acts.”93 Furthermore, the NMT found 
that von Leeb did not prevent the illegal application of the order by 
clarification or otherwise by including further instructions.94 “Having set this 
instrument in motion, he must assume a measure of responsibility for its 
illegal application[,]”and is thus, indirectly responsible for failing to place 
safeguards within the order.95
The theory behind command responsibility is twofold. First, “[b]y doing 
nothing he cannot wash his hands of international responsibility.”96 A legal 
advisor has the ability to influence the application of the policy, and probably 
understands that he has this capability. Thus, when a reasonable legal advisor 
has reason to know that although the policy is legal, it is ambiguous, he is just 
as culpable as a person who implements the illegal policy. Second, in 
implementing an ambiguous policy, the legal advisor has breached his duty.97 
Because the machinery of the government not only requires the forging and 
implementation of policy but also the application of that policy by others, a 
90 Art 5 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
succinctly summarizes command responsibility. “An individual shall be responsible 
for a [war crime] if that individual... [f]ails to prevent or repress the commission of 
such a crime in the circumstances set out in article 5....” Draft Code of P&SM art 2, 
above  note 3, [1996] 2 YB Int’l LComm’n at 18-19. 
91 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 521-25. 
92 Id at 560. 
93 Id For more information about the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, see above  note 
61 and accompanying text. 
94 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 560. 
95 Id at 561-62. 
96 Id at 512. 
97 See Colonel William G Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a 
Workable Standard, 97 Mil L Rev 1, 5 (1982) (emphasizing that command 
responsibility does not attach unless the actor has breached a duty). 
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reasonable legal advisor should know that policy is created so that others will 
follow that policy. Thus, the person in charge of implementing that policy has 
the duty to create a policy that is sufficiently definite. 
 Therefore, the doctrine of command responsibility requires that a 
person, such as a legal advisor, who “knew or had reason to know, in the 
circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was going 
to commit such a crime[, the legal advisor must] take all necessary measures 
within their power to prevent or repress the crime.”98  Therefore, while the 
policy is not necessarily criminal under international law, where a reasonable 
legal advisor would understand that the policy creates a permissive 
atmosphere for criminal conduct, the legal advisor should be held accountable 
for the actions that follow from that policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This analysis of culpability is narrowly tailored by the policy of 
deterrence. A person who leads others to commit a crime and the person who 
actually commits the crime share equal culpability in the commission of the 
crime.99 The Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”) in the High Command 
Case succinctly described it this way: “It is self-evident that national policies 
are made by man. When men make a policy that is criminal under 
international law, they are criminally responsible for so doing. This is the 
logical and inescapable conclusion.”100 Furthermore, “[i]f the policy under 
which it is initiated is criminal in its intent and purpose it is so because the 
individuals at the policy-making level had a criminal intent and purpose in 
determining the policy.”101 In addition, because the masterminds of the 
criminal violations are not involved with the physical action of committing 
the crime, failure to hold these masterminds accountable for their complicity 
would undermine the principle of deterrence. Since “[t]he acts prohibited are 
without deterrent effect unless they are punishable as crimes[,]”102 holding 
those creating the elaborate scheme has significant deterrent effect. 
“We refuse to accept the notion that lawyers may do anything, including 
violating the law, to zealously advocate their clients' interests and then avoid 
criminal prosecution by claiming that they were ‘just doing their job.’”103 In 
many states in the United States a legal advisor is domestically responsible for 
his work product. His responsibility flows to his client and to the licensing 
98 Draft Code of P&SM art 6, above  note 3, [1996] 2 YB Int’l LComm’n at 25. 
99 Harris, above  note 15, at 503. 
100 High Command Case, above  note 2, at 490. 
101 Id at 486. 
102 Hostage Case, above  note 18, at 1240. 
103 United States v Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir 1998). 
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authority that permits him to practice law.104 In addition, when the legal 
advisor is counseling the government on issues involving international law, 
the legal advisor has an obligation not only to the general welfare of the 
citizenry105 and the specific government agency requesting counsel,106 but 
also to the international community.  
Especially in this age of globalism, a legal advisor’s responsibility 
necessarily extends to the international community.107 Because “international 
law is not the product of an international legislature,”108 the legal advisor’s 
role is especially important. Therefore, when a legal advisor takes a direct role 
in an international crime, he must be held responsible for it. In addition, where 
the legal advisor takes a direct role in a policy that while technically legal, 
creates a permissive atmosphere for illegal conduct, the legal advisor must be 
responsible for creating safeguards to prevent the possibility of illegal 
conduct. 
 
104 In the United States, a lawyer is responsible for his advice to his client and may be 
sued in civil court under professional malpractice. See, e.g., Doe v Hughes, 838 P 2d 
804 (Alaska 1992) (rendering the law firm guilty of professional malpractice because 
it breached the duty of care owed to the client). Generally, a lawyer may also be 
disciplined by the state’s highest court for professional misconduct. The Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct state that 
[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist 
or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official 
or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other 
law; or 
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of 
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 8.4(a) (2004); see, eg, In re Carnesi, 784 N.Y.S.2d 
892 (NY App Div 2004) (accepting attorney’s resignation and ordering that the 
attorney be disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys). 
105 See, e.g., United States v Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming defendant 
lawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States and obstruction of 
justice). 
106 Bilder & Vagts, above  note 11, at 693. 
107 See generally Winston P. Nagan, Lawyers Roles, Identity, and Professional 
Responsibility in an Age of Globalism, 13 FLA J INT’L L131 (2001) (explaining the 
various roles of a legal advisor). 
108 Major War Criminals, above  note 5, at 221. 
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